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for $63,120 representing the margin calls paid to that date
by the elevator.10
The court’s opinion
The trial court first concluded that the contracts were
not illegal, off-exchange contracts under the Commodity
Exchange Act.11  That continues to be a major concern for
contracts calling for the sale of several years of
production.12
Even though the court said the contracts were not
invalid under federal law, the court held against the
elevator as to the reasonableness of the demand for
assurance.13 The UCC provision reads as follows:
“A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each
party that the other’s expectation of receiving due
performance will not be impaired.  When reasonable
grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the
performance of either party, the other may in writing
demand adequate assurance of due performance and
until that party receives such assurance may if
commercially reasonable suspend any performance for
which that party has not already received the agreed
return.”
The UCC provision goes on to state -
“Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for
insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall
be determined according to commercial standards.”15
Thus, any request for adequate assurance should come
only after there are good, solid grounds for believing
that the other party may not perform under the contract.
The cooperative in this case argued three grounds for its
insecurity - (1) the rising market price for corn in 1996
(which the court rejected); (2) statements of public officials
(apparently the Iowa Attorney General) regarding the
potential illegality of the six contracts in question (which
the court also rejected); and (3) the farmer’s past refusal to
purchase herbicide under a “booking” arrangement with the
cooperative when the farmer found a cheaper price
elsewhere (which the court did not view as providing
grounds for a demand for adequate assurance).1 6  In
rejecting the grounds for invoking the adequate
performance provision, the court said the cooperative had
worked itself into a financial corner and that the demand
for assurance from Heyes was in bad faith.  The court
concluded that it was the elevator’s indebtedness that had
caused the demand for adequate assurance.  Thus, the
elevator was responsible for breach of the contracts; the
losses remained with the elevator.
In conclusion
The message is clear – anyone feeling insecure should
proceed cautiously and with an eye to what the contract
calls for before making demands for adequate performance.
For contracts between merchants, and the Iowa court
determined that both the farmer and the elevator were
merchants, demands for adequate assurance must be
commercially reasonable.
There are dozens of cases slated for trial over the next
several weeks in Iowa alone, not to mention the other states
where the hedge-to-arrive contract virus had spread.
Moreover, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
commenced agency hearings in Minnesota in early
February, 1998.  More guidance is expected on the legality
of HTAs.
FOOTNOTES
1 Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Heyes, No. 23493 (Dist. Ct.
for Kossuth County, Iowa, December 23, 1997).
2 See generally 10 Harl Agricultural Law § 74.04 (Supp.
1997). See Harl, “Hazards of Hedge-to-Arrive
Contracts,” 7 Agric. L. Dig. 77 (1996); Harl, “Hedge-to-
Arrive Contracts:  Two Federal Court Cases,” 8 Agric.
L. Dig. 153 (1997).
3 UCC § 2-2609.







11 Futures Trading Act of 1921, Sec. 4, 42 Stat. 187
(1921).  See Harl, “Hazards of Hedge-to-Arrive
Contracts, 7 Agric. L. Dig. 77 (1996).
12 See Harl, “Hedge-to-Arrive Contracts:  Two Federal
Court Cases,” 8 Agric. L. Dig. 153 (1997).
13 Iowa Code § 554.2609 (1997).
14 Id., § 554.2609(1).
15 Id., § 554.2609 (2).
16 Farmers Cooperative Elevator v. Heyes, n. 1 supra.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was a veterinarian who had
treated horses owned by the defendant on several
occasions. The plaintiff was injured while treating one
horse for lameness in a paddock. Another horse, either
already in the paddock or after entering the paddock from
an adjoining pasture, kicked the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued
under theories of negligence or “animal injury liability.”
The defendant argued that (1) the plaintiff had to show that
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the defendant knew the kicking horse had a propensity to
kick or (2) the plaintiff assumed the risk of being kicked.
The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment,
alternatively on both arguments. The assumption of risk
issue was not discussed on appeal. The plaintiff recognized
that the need to prove propensity to kick was the law in
South Carolina, but argued that the rule created in
Hossenlopp v. Cannon, 329 S.E.2d 438 (1985) for dogs
should apply as well to horses. In Hossenlopp, the court
held that an owner of a dog was liable for injuries caused
by the bite of the dog unless the dog was provoked by the
person bitten. The legislature also enacted a law
incorporating that judge-made rule. The court in this case
declined to expand that rule to include injuries caused by
kicking horses and held that, because the plaintiff failed to
prove that the horse had a propensity to kick humans, the
defendant was not liable for injuries caused by the kicking
horse. Henry v. Lewis, 489 S.E.2d 639 (S.C. Ct. App.
1997).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
SECURED CLAIMS. The debtor had purchased an
automobile on installments with a loan from a creditor. The
creditor perfected a security interest in the automobile 21
days after the debtor took possession of the automobile.
The debtor filed for Chapter 13 and the trustee sought to
avoid under Section 547 the security interest as a
preference because the security interest was not perfected
within 20 days after possession of the collateral by the
debtor. Under state law, the creditor had 30 days to file the
security interest which then became effective on the day of
creation of the security interest. The court held that the
federal 20-day period controlled for purposes of avoidance
by the trustee and that the state law allowing relation back
to the day of creation had no affect on the federal rule. The
court noted that enforcement of the federal rule fulfilled the
policy of uniformity of bankruptcy cases throughout the
states. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink, 118 S.
CT. 651 (1998).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. The bankruptcy
estate incurred post-petition interest and penalties. The
trustee filed the estate’s income tax return late and
requested a determination of the estate’s unpaid tax
liability. The IRS sent the trustee a “Section 505(b) letter”
stating that the return was accepted as filed. The Chapter 7
plan provided for payment of the remaining post-petition
tax liability with the other unsecured creditors and the IRS
objected to the plan, arguing that the post-petition taxes,
interest and penalties were entitled to administrative
expense priority. The trustee argued that the Section 505(b)
letter removed any further tax liability. The court held that
Section 505(b) affected only the liability of the trustee and
the debtor and the bankruptcy estate remained liable for
any unpaid taxes; therefore, the post-petition taxes were
entitled to administrative expense priority. In re Goodrich,
215 B.R. 638 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997).
DISCHARGE. The debtor failed to timely file tax
returns for 1980-1982. In 1985, the IRS prepared substitute
returns and assessed the debtor for the taxes determined by
those returns. The debtor did not assist the IRS in preparing
the returns nor did the debtor sign those returns. In 1995,
the debtor filed returns for 1980-1982 mirroring the returns
prepared by the IRS. The debtor sought to have the 1980-
1982 taxes declared dischargeable because the debtor filed
the returns more than three years before the bankruptcy
filing. The IRS argued that the debtor’s returns were a legal
nullity because the returns were ineffectual to change the
assessment of taxes. The court held that a valid return must
appear on its face to be an honest and genuine endeavor to
satisfy tax law. The court held that the debtor’s over ten-
year late returns were not an honest and genuine endeavor
to comply with the return filing requirements because the
only reason the returns were filed was to make the taxes
dischargeable. The court noted that the debtor made no
attempt to help the IRS prepare the substitute returns nor
did the debtor’s returns provide additional information. In
re Mickens, 215 B.R. 693 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997),
aff’d, 214 B.R. 976 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
The debtors filed a tax return for 1991 by crossing out all
lines as to income or deductions and putting a zero in the
line for tax due. The return claimed a refund for all
withheld taxes. The IRS argued that the 1991 return did not
qualify as a return for purposes of Section 523(a)(1)(B)(i)
because the returns did not contain any income or
deduction information. The court distinguished the current
case from United States v. Long, 618 F.2d 74 (9th Cir.
1980) where the taxpayers put zeros in each line. The court
held that the 1991 return was not a return for purposes of
Section 523 and the taxes, interest and penalties were
nondischargeable. In re LaRue, 215 B.R. 766 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1997).
JURISDICTION. The debtor was a corporation which
owed employment taxes. The IRS filed a claim for the
taxes but had also assessed a director the 100 percent
penalty under I.R.C. § 6672. The director filed a motion in
the bankruptcy case for a determination of whether the
penalty was properly assessed. The IRS argued that the
court did not have jurisdiction over the issue because the
issue was not related to or arose out of the bankruptcy case.
The director argued that Section 505(a)(1) allowed the
court to determine the tax liability of the director, a
nondebtor. The court held that Section 505 applied only to
the tax liability of the debtor or tax liabilities that would
affect claims against the debtor; therefore, the court did not
have jurisdiction over the I.R.C. § 6672 liability of a
nondebtor. The court also held that it had no authority to
issue a stay against collection of the director’s tax liability
because the Anti-Injunction Act prevented restraint of
collection efforts by the IRS. In re Proactive
Technologies, Inc., 215 B.R. 796 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997).
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FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
APPEALS. The plaintiff were farmers who borrowed
funds from the FSA. The plaintiffs defaulted on the loans
and were denied delinquent farmer loan servicing. The
plaintiffs appealed the denial and were successful in
overturning the decision. The plaintiffs then sought
attorney fees and other expenses under the Equal Access to
Justice Act (EAJA). The plaintiffs appealed denial of the
fees and expenses through the National Appeals Division
which denied the fees and expenses on the basis that the
EAJA did not apply to NAD appeals because NAD appeals
were not under Section 554 of the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA) as required by the EAJA. The court
held that NAD proceedings were under the APA because
(1) the proceedings were adjudications; (2) there is an
opportunity for a hearing; and (3) the hearing must be on
the record. The USDA also argued that NAD enabling law
and regulations makes the APA inapplicable to NAD
proceedings. The court held that the statute did not
expressly remove NAD proceedings from under the APA;
therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to fees and expenses if
the USDA position was not substantially justified. The
District Court had ruled that the USDA position was not
substantially justified but the appellate court reversed,
holding that there must first be a determination of that issue
at the NAD level before a court review of the issue. Lane
v. USDA, ___ F. 3d___, No. 96-3285ND (8th Cir. 1997).
HERBICIDES. See McAlpine v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag.
Co., 947 P.2d 474 (Mont. 1997), under Product Liability
infra.
PESTICIDES. See Hopkins v. American Cyanamid Co.,
674 So.2d 1042 (La. Ct. App. 1996), on rem. from, 666
So.2d 615 (La. 1996), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, 658
So.2d 196 (La. Ct. App. 1995), under Product Liability
infra.
POULTRY. The FSIS has adopted as final regulations
amending the poultry products inspection regulations by
adding a provision to permit manufacturers of poultry
products to interchange the amounts and kinds of poultry,
within specified limits, in a product without requiring that
each such formulation change have a separate label. The
provision applied in situations where two kinds of poultry
make up at least 70 percent of the poultry and poultry
ingredients used in the product formulation and neither of
the two kinds of poultry used constitute less than 30 percent
of the poultry and poultry ingredients used. In these
situations, one label with the word ``and'' instead of a
comma between the names of each of the kinds of poultry
in the ingredients statement, and in the product name,
indicates to consumers that the order of predominance of
the two kinds of poultry may be interchanged. This action
was designed to provide consistent provisions for meat and
poultry products. 63 Fed. Reg. 11359 (March 9, 1998).
TOBACCO. The FSA has adopted as final regulations
improving the administration of the tobacco marketing
quota and price support program by amending program
regulations to: (1) provide for making quota “inequity
adjustments” on a “common ownership unit” basis rather
than strictly on a “farm” basis; (2) eliminate unduly
restrictive deadlines for the mailing of certain quota
notices; permit, for burley and flue-cured tobacco, disaster
transfers to be made by cash lessees, from cash rented
farms, without the owner's signature; (3) provide greater
flexibility in the setting of penalty amounts for burley and
flue-cured tobacco violations; (4) eliminate a provision that
requires yearly publication in the Federal Register of
certain routine and noncontroversial penalty computations;
(5) remove regulations governing the 1994-calendar year
only “domestic marketing assessment”, which was
applicable to the use by certain cigarette manufacturers of
set percentages of domestic tobacco; and (6) codify certain
statutory provisions concerning, and penalties related to,
setting burley and flue-cured tobacco quotas. 63 Fed. Reg.
11581 (March 10, 1998).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY-ALM § 5.02[1].* The
decedent's father purchased a New Mexico ranch in 1958
and had the warranty deed recorded in the names of the
decedent and the father as joint tenants. The decedent's
parents owned real property in Arizona and in 1974, the
decedent exchanged the interest in the New Mexico
property for the father's interest in the Arizona property, so
the decedent and mother ended up owning the Arizona
property. In the following years, the decedent and mother
exchanged the property they owned for other properties,
eventually acquiring a property in California in 1981 and
1986. In all these transactions, the decedent was recorded
as "dealing with his sole and separate property." The
decedent died intestate in 1990. The decedent’s wife was
the estate's personal representative. In 1991 the spouse
petitioned a California court, alleging that the California
property was community property and requesting a
determination that half the property passed to the spouse by
intestate succession and that the other half was the spouse’s
own property. The state court granted the petition. The
spouse included half the value of the California property in
the decedent's gross estate and deducted the value of the
spouse’s interest as property passing to the spouse. The IRS
determined an estate tax deficiency, asserting that the
property was the decedent's separate property. The court
held that the property belonged entirely to the decedent
because the spouse never asserted any community property
interest in the New Mexico property or any of the
subsequent properties. The appellate court decision is
designated as not for publication. Kenly v. Comm’r, 98-1
U.S Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,032 (9th Cir. 1998), aff’g, T.C.
Memo. 1996-516.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* Under the
terms of the decedent’s will a QTIP trust was established
for the surviving spouse with the remainder passing to the
decedent’s child. The surviving spouse was entitled to all
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trust income, payable at least annually for the spouse’s life
but the spouse did not have a general power of appointment
over trust principal. The spouse purchased the child’s
remainder interest for a promissory note for the fair market
value, then the trustee distributed all of the trust principal to
the spouse and the spouse used some of those assets to pay
off the promissory note.  The trust was terminated with the
spouse holding assets equal in value to the value of the
original life interest in the trust and the child held assets
equal in value to the value of the remainder interest.  The
spouse argued that no gift tax resulted because the child
received full and adequate consideration in exchange for
the child’s interest in the trust. The IRS first ruled that the
transaction was a commutation of the respective trust
interests and that a commutation was a disposition under
I.R.C. § 2519 and Treas. Reg. § 25.2519-1(g), Example 2.
As a disposition of the spouse’s income interest in the
QTIP trust, the spouse is treated as having made a gift of
the value of the income interest to the child. The IRS
provided an alternative analysis to reach the same holding.
The IRS ruled that, because the acquisition of the income
interest by the spouse from the trust did not increase the
spouse’s gross estate, the receipt of the income interest was
not adequate consideration for the assets paid in exchange
for the income interest. The IRS noted that the same result
would apply where only a portion of the income interest
was acquired by the spouse and the result would not be
changed if the spouse had paid for the interest from the
spouse’s own assets instead of using the trust’s assets to
pay off the note. Rev. Rul. 98-8, 1998-6, __.
TRUSTS. The taxpayer established an irrevocable trust
for a child. The beneficiary was to receive trust income as
in the trustee’s discretion was necessary for the
beneficiary’s health, education and support, with
undistributed income accumulated in principal. The
beneficiary had the power to appoint all trust principal
when the beneficiary reached the age of 35. The beneficiary
also had a testamentary power to appoint trust principal.
The remainder interest in the trust was to pass to the
beneficiary’s issue per stirpes.  The trust also provided that
when any additional property was contributed to the trust,
the trustee was to inform the beneficiary of the contribution
within 14 days after the contribution and the beneficiary
had 30 days from the date of the notice to request
withdrawal of the contributed property. The IRS ruled that
the beneficiary was considered the owner of the trust and
that the contributions to the trust would be eligible for the
gift tax annual exclusion. Ltr. Rul. 9810006, Nov. 6, 1997;
Ltr. Rul. 9810007, Nov. 6, 1997; Ltr. Rul. 9810008, Nov.
6, 1997.
The IRS has issued guidance, in anticipation of
regulations, on the ordering and taxation of tax items in
I.R.C. § 664(b)(2) distributions which included capital




DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].* The taxpayer, an
experienced tax attorney, purchased bonds through a
broker. The taxpayer purchased a life estate in the bonds
and the taxpayer’s daughters purchased the remainder
interests with funds given to them by the taxpayer. After
enactment of I.R.C. § 167(e), the ownership of the
daughters was changed to life estates and the remainder
was held by the taxpayer’s secretary, also purchased with
funds supplied by the taxpayer. The taxpayer claimed
amortization deductions for the life estate interest in the
bonds. The court used the step-transaction doctrine to hold
that the taxpayer purchased the entire interests in the bonds
and divided the interests in the bonds afterward, making the
taxpayer’s interest in the bonds ineligible for amortization.
Kornfield v. Comm’r, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,241 (10th Cir. 1998), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1996-472.
The IRS has issued tables detailing the limitation on
depreciation deductions for electrically propelled
automobiles first placed in service after August 5, 1997 and
before January 1, 1998:
   Tax Year      Amount  
1st tax year ........................................... $9,480
2d tax year............................................15,100
3d tax year..............................................9,050
Each succeeding year ............................. 5,425
The amounts are three times the amounts allowed for gas
powered automobiles. The IRS also issued tables providing
the amounts to be included in income for automobiles first
leased after August 5, 1997 and before January 1, 1998.
Rev. Proc. 98-24, I.R.B. 1998-10, 31.
DISASTER LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[2].*  The IRS has
issued a list of areas declared by the President to be
adversely affected by disaster of sufficient severity and
magnitude to warrant Federal assistance. Under I.R.C. §
165(i), the taxpayers in these areas may elect to deduct (if
otherwise deductible as a casualty loss or business losses)
losses suffered from these disasters in the tax year
immediately preceding the tax year in which the disaster
occurred. The election is to be made by filing a return,
amended return or claim for refund by the later of (1) the
due date of the taxpayer’s income tax return (not including
extensions) for the tax year in which the disaster occurred
or (2) the due date of the taxpayer’s income tax return (not
including extensions) for the tax year preceding the tax
year in which the disaster occurred. See Treas. Reg. §
1.165-11(e). Rev. Rul. 98-12. I.R.B. 1998-10, 5.
HOME OFFICE-ALM § 4.03[13].* The taxpayer had
obtained a paralegal degree and worked sporadically as a
paralegal for several employees for two years. The taxpayer
suffered injuries and illnesses which prevented the taxpayer
from working full-time and the taxpayer set up a home
office to work as an independent contractor of paralegal
services. During the time of the office set up, the taxpayer
did not earn any income but the taxpayer intended to return
46                                                                                                                                                                 Agricultural Law     Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
to work as soon as the taxpayer was physically able. The
court held that the taxpayer could deduct expenses related
to the home office during the non-working period, except
for the portion of rent paid on the office area. Gallo v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-100.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING-ALM § 6.03[1].* The
taxpayer was a shareholder in a corporation and sold some
stock to another corporation for cash equal to the “net asset
value” plus an earnout payable for 48 months. The earnout
was contingent on the buyer generating earnings greater
than a percentage of sale on a specified date. The taxpayer
was liable for repayment of an amount if the same
percentage of sales does not equal or exceed that repayment
amount. The buyer’s earnings included the earnings from
the taxpayer’s corporation’s business. Neither corporation
expected to generate sufficient earnings to produce any
earnout amount over the 48 months. The taxpayer argued
that, under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(c)(3)(i), the
taxpayer’s stock basis would be allocated in equal
increments to the taxable years in which payments would
be received, i.e., 20 percent in each of five years. Under the
first year of the sale contract, the taxpayer received 88.5
percent of the total expected sale proceeds and argued that
88.5 percent of the stock basis should be allocated to that
tax year, resulting in recovery of basis at a rate more than
double the normal 20 percent rate. The IRS ruled that the
basis recovery rate provided in Temp. Treas. Reg. §
15A.453-1(c)(3)(i) would unreasonably defer recovery and
that the taxpayer could use the alternative basis recovery
method to reflect the payment of the sale proceeds. Ltr.
Rul. 9811039, Dec. 11, 1997.
INTEREST RATE .  The IRS has announced that for the
period April 1, 1998 through June 30, 1998, the interest
rate paid on tax overpayments is 7 percent and for
underpayments is 8 percent. The interest rate for
underpayments by large corporations is 10 percent. Rev.
Rul. 98-17, I.R.B. 1998-__.
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[3].* The
taxpayers owned a condominium in another part of the
country from where they lived. The taxpayers hired a
management company to handle rental of the unit. The
management company advertised the unit, approved
tenants, handled repairs and made utility payments. The
taxpayers received a portion of the management company’s
income from the unit based on the number of days the unit
was rented each year. The unit was rented on an “at will”
basis. The taxpayers argued that they actively participated
in the rental activity because, when the rent statements
arrived each month, the taxpayers made the decision to
retain the tenants or not. However, the taxpayers provided
no evidence that they personally approved of tenants,
decided rental terms, approved of expenditures for repairs
and capital improvements or otherwise participated in the
management of the unit. The court found that the
management company did all of these activities. Thus, the
court held that the taxpayers did not actively participate in
the rental of the unit and were not eligible for the $25,000
offset of passive activity losses under I.R.C. § 469(i).
Madler v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-112.
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has issued procedures for
comprehensive correction programs for sponsors of
retirement programs which do not satisfy the requirements
of I.R.C. §§ 401(a) or 403(a). Previous procedures had
created several separate programs, including the Voluntary
Compliance Program, the Walk-in Closing Agreement
Program and the Audit Closing Agreement Program. The
new procedure modifies and consolidates these programs
into one Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System
(EPCRS). The new procedures, however, do not modify the
Tax Sheltered Annuity Voluntary Correction Program.
Rev. Proc. 98-22, 1998-__, __.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
April 1998
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.51 5.44 5.40 5.38
110% AFR 6.07 5.98 5.94 5.91
120% AFR 6.64 6.53 6.48 6.44
Mid-term
AFR 5.70 5.62 5.58 5.56
110% AFR 6.28 6.18 6.13 6.10
120% AFR 6.85 6.74 6.68 6.65
Long-term
AFR 5.98 5.89 5.85 5.82
110% AFR 6.58 6.48 6.43 6.39
120% AFR 7.19 7.07 7.01 6.97
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
SHAREHOLDER BASIS. The taxpayers were
shareholders in an S corporation which had a loan
obligation with a bank. The shareholders gave the bank
their personal notes in exchange for the bank canceling the
corporation note. The shareholders’ liability on the notes
was proportionate to their interests in the corporation. The
shareholders’ notes carried current market terms and rates.
The corporation note and the shareholders’ notes used some
of the same collateral to secure the notes, but the collateral
was owned by the shareholders. The IRS ruled that (1) the
exchange of shareholder indebtedness for the corporation’s
indebtedness to the bank created indebtedness from the
corporation to the shareholders, increasing the
shareholders’ basis in the corporation, (2) the use of the
shareholders’ collateral for both notes did not constitute a
protection against loss under I.R.C. § 465(b)(4), and (3)
each shareholder is at risk as to each shareholder’s portion
of the notes. The ruling did not cover the deductibility of
any corporation losses by the shareholders under I.R.C. §
465(b)(2)(A). Ltr. Rul. 9811016, Dec. 3, 1997; Ltr. Rul.
9811017, Dec. 3, 1997; Ltr. Rul. 9811018, Dec. 3, 1997;
Ltr. Rul. 9811019, Dec. 3, 1997.
PRODUCT LIABILITY
HERBICIDE-ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiffs were wheat
and barley farmers and applied to their crops herbicide
manufactured by the defendant. For several weeks after the
application, the nighttime temperatures were near or below
freezing. A state Department of Agriculture expert told the
plaintiffs that cold temperatures could cause damage to
crops treated with the herbicide. The plaintiffs sued in
negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability, claiming
that the defendant was negligent in manufacturing,
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advertising and selling a product which could cause
damage when applied at the normal time for application, in
the spring when the nights were cold. The trial court
dismissed all claims as preempted by FIFRA. The appellate
court held that the negligence action was preempted by
FIFRA because the action was based on the defendant’s
failure to warn about the cold problem. The court held that
the breach of warranty action was not necessarily
preempted by FIFRA because the plaintiff alleged some
representations were made by agents of the defendant
during the sale of the herbicide. The court also allowed the
strict liability claim to remain until discovery was
completed by the parties to see if any actions by the
defendant, outside of the label, gave rise to a strict liability
claim. The court noted that the EPA approval of the
herbicide label did not absolve the defendant of all liability
where the product was advertised and sold in areas were the
product would not work according to the label instructions.
McAlpine v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag. Co., 947 P.2d 474
(Mont. 1997).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiffs were cotton
farmers who applied an insecticide to their cotton crop in
combination with a herbicide. The plaintiffs sued the
manufacturer of the insecticide for negligence, breach of
warranty and strict liability. Four of the claims against the
defendant involved the failure to warn about the dangers to
crops from applying the insecticide with the herbicide. The
Court of Appeals initially ruled that these claims were pre-
empted by FIFRA. The plaintiffs also alleged that (1) the
defendant negligently designed the insecticide so that if
used with another product it would cause damage to cotton
crops and (2) the defendant failed to adequately test the
insecticide with other products to discover the danger of
combined application. The Court of Appeals held that these
two claims were essentially claims of failure to warn and
were also pre-empted by FIFRA. The Supreme Court
affirmed the holding that the actions based on the failure of
the defendant manufacturers to warn about the mixing of
the chemicals were preempted by FIFRA. The Supreme
Court held that the claim that either or both chemicals were
defective for use on cotton crops was not preempted by
FIFRA. The Supreme Court upheld the jury verdict for the
plaintiffs on this issue. The breach of warranty action was
remanded for determination of whether sufficient evidence
was presented to support the jury verdict for the plaintiffs.
On remand, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that the defendant’s statements were
an express warranty or guarantee that the two products
could be used together safely. Hopkins v. American
Cyanamid Co., 674 So.2d 1042 (La. Ct. App. 1996), on
rem. from, 666 So.2d 615 (La. 1996), aff’g in part and
rev’g in part, 658 So.2d 196 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
WATER RIGHTS
TRANSFER OF WATER RIGHTS. The plaintiff sold
80 acres of farmland to the defendant who granted the
plaintiff an easement to draw water from the land. The
water was transferred from the well to another parcel of
farm land. At the time of the contract, Nebraska law
prohibited the transfer of water under one parcel of land to
another; however, the parties complied with the contract for
five years until the plaintiff rented land from a third party
that the defendant had previously rented. The plaintiff sued
to enforce the contract. After the contract was executed and
before the suit was brought, the Nebraska legislature
enacted a law allowing the transfer of water to another
parcel of land. The defendant argued that the contract was
void because it had an illegal purpose when executed. The
court held that the enactment of the new law made the
contract legal because it was the legislature’s intent to
legalize a practice which was common. Because the
contract had a legal purpose when the suit was brought, the
court enforced it to require the defendant to allow the
plaintiff to draw water from the land as provided in the




AGRICULTURAL WORKER EXEMPTION. The
plaintiff was employed by an independent contractor hired
by the defendant as a chicken catcher, boxer and loader.
The plaintiff performed the services on farms but only for
so long as necessary to catch and load the chickens. The
plaintiff was injured while performing these duties and
sought workers’ compensation for the injuries. The state
Board of Workers’ Compensation denied the plaintiff’s
claim, ruling that the plaintiff was a poultry handler which
met the definition of “farm laborer” exempt from workers’
compensation coverage. The independent contractor was
not engaged in farming but was only involved in the
catching and loading of chickens purchased by the
defendant from farmers. The court held that the plaintiff
was not a farm laborer, because the plaintiff’s employment
was more similar to trade and commerce than to the raising
of chickens. J & C Poultry v. Reyes-Guzman, 489 S.E.2d
853 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
ZONING
CONDITIONAL USE. The plaintiff owed and operated
a golf course situated on urban land in an urban growth
boundary. The plaintiff sought to expand the golf course on
to land zoned for exclusive farm use (EFU), some of which
was “high-value farmland.” The central issue was whether
Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.283(2)(e) prohibited expansion of a
golf course on EFU land unless the golf course was already
situated on EFU land. The court held that the statute
provided rules only to govern the expansion of golf courses
on EFU land and had no requirement that only golf courses
located on EFU land could expand on EFU land. DLCD v.
Jackson County, 948 P.2d 731 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
AGRICULTURAL LAW PRESS
P.O.  B o x  5 0 7 0 3 Eugene,  OR 97405
48
PRINCIPLES OF AGRICULTURAL LAW
by Roger McEowen & Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf textbook is ideal for instructors, attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who teach agricultural law courses in law schools or at the junior college or university levels.
The book contains over 900 pages plus an index, table of cases and glossary. The chapters include discussion of legal
issues, examples, lengthy quotations from cases and review questions.
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Instructors who adopt the text for purchase by students receive a free copy and all updates. Updates are published every
August and December to keep the Principles current with the latest developments. Student purchasers are entitled to one free
update, with subsequent updates available at $30 per year.
If you would like a review a copy for use in a course or to purchase a copy of the Principles, please contact: Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients.  The book contains over 900 pages and an index. The Manual is
particularly strong in the areas of federal income and estate taxes, farm bankruptcy, and farm business planning.
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As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra charge
updates published within five months after purchase . Updates are published every four months to keep the Manual
current with the latest developments. After the first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100 per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege on both publications.
